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For  more than  fifteen  years, the  telecommunications  equipment  sector has 
played a prominent role in straining trade relations between the United States 
and Japan. The industry’s most recent trade dispute was precipitated by  Mo- 
torola’s charge that technical standards effectively barred its entry into Japan’s 
cellular  telephone  market.  Cellular  systems face the technical  challenge  of 
transferring calls as customers roam from one company’s cells to another. In 
both the United States and Japan, this challenge was solved by establishing 
regulatory  standards to ensure compatibility  among local service providers. 
However,  compatibility  did  not  extend  internationally  between  the  United 
States operating standard (developed jointly by Motorola and AT&T) and the 
Japanese  standard (developed by  Nippon Telephone  and Telegraph  [NTT]). 
While Japanese cellular companies surmounted the US.  standards barrier by 
modifying their equipment for export, Motorola’s entry strategy into Japan re- 
lied instead on lobbying for market access guarantees under U.S.  trade law. 
After contentious and prolonged negotiations between the office of the US. 
trade representative (USTR) and the Ministry of International Trade and Indus- 
try (MITI), a compromise was reached in  1987. Japan agreed to license Mo- 
torola with a local partner (Daini-Denden  [DDI]) to supply cellular service 
outside  the  Tokyo-Nagoya  corridor  using  Motorola’s  standard. The Tokyo- 
Nagoya corridor would be served by Nippon Idou Tsushin (IDO) operating on 
NTT’s standard, and NTT itself would offer cellular service throughout Japan. 
Motorola originally accepted this compromise but by  1989 had reasserted its 
claim of  market access barriers by arguing that its cellular system remained 
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disadvantaged because it was not fully portable within Japan. Under renewed 
pressure from the USTR and Japan’s Ministry of  Posts and Telecommunica- 
tions, ID0  and NTT agreed to cede radio spectrum for Motorola service in the 
Tokyo-Nagoya corridor. In 1993, the United States extracted additional spec- 
trum concessions that gave Motorola and NTT equal population coverage, ef- 
fectively nullifying NTT’s ten-year head start in its local market. 
The market access charges raised during the cellular dispute were not unfa- 
miliar to the industry. Once telecommunications equipment began trading in- 
ternationally in volume beginning in the late 1970s, the industry attracted on- 
going  congressional  scrutiny. In  1979, a congressional  task  force charged 
Japan with “using their protected home market to improve their telecommuni- 
cations technology while exporting as much as they can into the open Ameri- 
can market” (U.S. Congress 1979, 33). Responding to congressional pressure, 
the USTR began negotiations with Japan in 198  1, seeking to stem the widening 
bilateral trade imbalance. These early negotiations yielded few tangible results, 
however, and exports to Japan remained almost level, while imports continued 
nearly to double annually. In  1985, the United States elevated the dispute by 
including  telecommunications  equipment  in  the  Market-Oriented  Sector- 
Selective (MOSS) talks. Despite this renewed negotiating pressure, however, 
the bilateral imbalance continued to widen. The apparent failure of negotia- 
tions finally culminated in the passage of the Telecommunications Trade Act 
of  1988, which authorized the USTR to impose unilateral sanctions against 
trading  partners  for “unfair  trade  practices”  in  the  industry.  Motorola  was 
among the first to use the act as a credible threat for pressing its market access 
demands in the cellular telephone dispute. 
Political rhetoric and policy demands notwithstanding, the American  and 
Japanese  telecommunications  equipment  industries  historically  have  been 
highly similar in their structures and openness to trade. In 1978, despite con- 
gressional claims of unequal  market access, both countries remained tightly 
closed. Imports represented less than 5 percent of  domestic equipment pur- 
chases in both markets, and the United States actually held a larger share of 
the Japanese market (3.4 percent) than Japan did in the United States (1.2 per- 
cent) (Japan Electronics Almanac 1984; U.S. Industrial Outlook 1980). If, as 
US. trade negotiators asserted, Japan had been pursuing a policy of import 
protection as export promotion during this period, there is nothing in the mar- 
ket share data to suggest that this strategy had been successful.’ 
Not until the early 1980s, as telecommunications markets were deregulated 
globally, did persistent  imbalances emerge in market penetration.  By  1992, 
once deregulation was effectively  concluded in the United States and Japan, 
import penetration in the United States had grown sixfold to 30.5 percent, and 
I. Krugman (1984) demonstrates how import protection in a decreasing-cost industry can raise 
firms’ export market share by guaranteeing them a secure domestic market. However, Dick (1994) 
finds no supporting evidence for a wide cross section of  decreasing-cost industries in the United 
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Japan’s share of U.S. telecommunications equipment purchases had risen eight- 
fold to 9.8 percent (Japan  Electronics Almanac 1994; U.S. Industrial Outlook 
1994).  By comparison, import penetration in Japan had risen only modestly to 
5.9 percent, with U.S. shipments continuing to account for less than 5 percent 
of Japanese imports. Trade policy-in  the traditional sense-appears  unlikely 
to have played a major role in generating these imbalances. Tariff rates on tele- 
communications equipment historically have been low and relatively uniform 
in  the  two  countries,  and  U.S. firms  have  not  regarded  Japanese  nontariff 
charges on imports as a serious impediment to market access.? 
An alternative explanation for telecommunications equipment trade patterns 
is suggested by  the “industrial organization approach to international trade.” 
The central insight of that literature is to acknowledge that foreign trade flows 
are influenced by  the domestic market’s structure and the form of contractual 
relations among firms.>  Historically, telecommunications markets in the United 
States and Japan (and in most other industrialized countries) were organized 
around domestic monopoly suppliers of telephone service. These firms either 
produced their own equipment directly through a wholly owned subsidiary, as 
in the case of AT&T and Western Electric, or purchased their equipment from 
a small family of preferred suppliers, as in the case of Japan’s NTT and NEC.4 
In both countries, the historically small number of equipment suppliers, com- 
bined with their preferential procurement ties to service carriers, were the di- 
rect outgrowth of economic and regulatory “barriers to entry” that shaped the 
industry’s structure and organization. 
In this paper, I define a bamer to entry to exist in an industry if economic 
fundamentals or policy choices (i) allow only a small number of  suppliers to 
coexist in the market or (ii) favor preferential, long-term contracts over com- 
petitive, arm’s-length transactions. The United States and Japan erected regula- 
tory barriers to entry in telecommunications  by directly barring competition 
from independent equipment producers and by indirectly encouraging monop- 
oly service carriers to tightly control equipment distribution within their net- 
work. For particular categories of  equipment, these regulatory barriers were 
reinforced  by  economic barriers to entry. Economic barriers  arose naturally 
from economies to scale (on the supply side) and network economies (on the 
demand side) and served both to limit the sustainable number of suppliers and 
to discourage arm’s-length sourcing. Common economic and regulatory barri- 
ers generated highly similar market structures and contracting practices in the 
2. Post-Tokyo  Round tariff rates on U.S. imports of  telecommunications products ranged from 
0.4 to 6.0 percent. Tariff rates in Japan ranged from 4.5 to 9.2 percent (US. International Trade 
Commission  1984, tables  1 and 3). In a 1984 survey by  the International Trade Commission of 
US.  telecommunications equipment producers, only two respondents of fifty-three cited Japanese 
nontariff charges on imports as an important barrier to trade (U.S. International Trade Commission 
1984, table F1). 
3. Important summary references include Helpman and Krugman (1985, 1989). 
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United States and Japan and effectively curtailed trade in telecommunications 
equipment for both countries until the late 1970s. 
During the next decade, deregulation in both countries gradually exposed 
telecommunications  monopolies  to  competition,  and  what  followed  was  a 
complete  restructuring  of  the  equipment market  and contracting   practice^.^ 
These changes coincided  with three major transformations in telecommuni- 
cations  equipment  trade  patterns.  First,  with  little  correlation  to  trends  in 
total merchandise, durable goods, or advanced technology trade balances, the 
United  States  abruptly  began  a  persistent  trade  deficit  in  telecommunica- 
tions equipment after 1982. Second, this trade deficit emerged in both “low- 
technology” and “high-technology’’ product  segments, although the deficits’ 
timing  and  persistence  varied  distinctly  within  the  industry.  Finally,  these 
changes initially were unique to the United States and were driven primarily by 
trade with Japan. Only later were they repeated in US.-Asian and European- 
Japanese trade patterns. 
The central question addressed by  this paper is the role that deregulation 
played in first precipitating and then ultimately sustaining the US.-Japan trade 
imbalance in telecommunications  equipment. Adopting the industrial organi- 
zation  approach to international trade, the paper assesses how foreign trade 
patterns were shaped by changes in domestic market structure and contracting 
practices induced by  deregulation. The analysis concludes  that deregulation 
played an essential role in each of the three major transformations in U.S. tele- 
communications equipment trade. 
First,  the  time profile  of  the  industry’s bilateral  trade  imbalance  closely 
tracks major changes in domestic market structure and contracting practices 
prompted by U.S. deregulation. Japanese deregulation occasionally reinforced 
these effects, while in other instances its effect on the bilateral trade imbalance 
was largely neutral. Second, the consequences of U.S. deregulation varied pre- 
dictably within the industry according to the origin of entry barriers. Monopo- 
lies in “low-technology” terminal equipment, which had been sustained solely 
by regulatory barriers to entry, were quickly eroded by international factor cost 
differentials following early deregulation. By contrast, monopolies in “high- 
technology”  network equipment, which were sustained additionally by  eco- 
nomic barriers to entry, were eroded only by the combination of proactive de- 
regulation and major technological advances. Finally, the initial uniqueness of 
the US.-Japan trade imbalance can be partially attributed to differences in the 
timing and scope of  deregulation in the two countries. These differences im- 
pinged on both economic and regulatory barriers to entry. 
The organization of  the paper is as follows. Section 5.1 reviews the major 
transformations affecting U.S. telecommunications equipment trade during the 
5. The political and economic forces leading to deregulation largely lie beyond the scope of this 
paper, which  will concentrate on the effects of  regulatory  policy.  No11  and Rosenbluth  (1993) 
dewribe many of these forces as they relate to regulatory changes in the United States and Japan. 121  Regulation and Telecommunications Trade 
past  decade and a half.  Section  5.2 develops an  empirical  linkage between 
industry  structure and foreign trade to explain patterns in “low-technology” 
terminal equipment trade. Section 5.3 undertakes a parallel analysis for “high- 
technology” network equipment. Finally, section 5.4 concludes by drawing im- 
plications  for ongoing changes in the telecommunications equipment indus- 
try’s structure. 
5.1  Transformations in U.S. Telecommunications  Equipment Trade 
International trade in communications equipment has been a relatively re- 
cent phenomenon. Prior to the mid- 1970s, equipment procurement historically 
had been  confined  within  national borders  in most  industrialized  countries, 
including the United  States and Japan. Gradually, changes in technology and 
regulation opened national markets to foreign trade. This section documents 
three major transformations  that shaped U.S. telecommunications equipment 
trade during the past fifteen years. First, the industry abruptly began a large 
and persistent trade deficit after 1982, distinguishing itself from trends in U.S. 
merchandise, durable goods, and advanced-technology trade. Second, the trade 
deficit’s timing and persistence  varied  distinctly for low-technology  terminal 
equipment versus high-technology  network equipment. Third, these transfor- 
mations initially were limited to U.S.-Japan trade, although subsequently they 
spread to US.-Asian and European-Japanese trade. These unique features of 
telecommunications trade led the United States to single out this industry for 
special bilateral negotiations, believing that Japanese trade practices and poli- 
cies were primary contributors to the industry’s difficulties. 
5.1.1  Comparisons of Sectoral Trends 
Having been a small net exporter of telecommunications  equipment for al- 
most a decade, after 1982, the United States abruptly began a persistent trade 
deficit. This reversal cannot be attributed simply to trends in U.S. overall mer- 
chandise trade or to trends for durable manufactures or advanced technology 
products in general. Figure 5.1 compares the trade balance for telecommunica- 
tions equipment (scaled by  industry  shipments; series  I) with the total U.S. 
merchandise  trade  balance  (scaled by  GNP; series  2) for a twenty-five-year 
period.h Until 1982, the two series were strongly correlated. Industry and mer- 
chandise trade  were  approximately balanced until  1974, and even  in  later 
years, as telecommunications equipment moved into surplus while merchan- 
dise trade was in deficit, the two series rarely diverged by more than 3 percent. 
Since 1982, however, the two series have exhibited little correlation. After de- 
regulation forced the breakup of AT&T, the U.S. trade balance in telecommuni- 
cations equipment deteriorated at a rate nearly four times faster than the mer- 
chandise trade  balance.  In  1989, the  telecommunications equipment deficit 
6. Series numbers refer to data for figures appearing in app. A 122  Andrew R. Dick 
20 
10  ivestiture Starts 
0 
-10- 
ATBT Divestiture Enas  -20  - 
-30- *  Telecom Equip 
Q  Merchandise 
+ Durables 
,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  , 
-40  7 
1966  1970  1974  1978  1982  1986  1990  1994 
Fig. 5.1 
balances (as a percentage of industry shipments or GNP) 
Sourres:  U.S. Industrial  Ourlook  (1970-74);  Staristical  Abstract  of  the  United  States  (197 1, 
1981, 1994). 
Telecommunications equipment, merchandise, and durables trade 
peaked at over 15 percent of industry shipments, while the merchandise trade 
deficit never reached 4 percent of GNP throughout the decade. 
Narrowing the focus to durable manufactures confirms telecommunications 
equipment’s unique recent history. The remaining series in figure 5.1 plots the 
U.S. trade balance for durable goods (scaled by sectoral shipments; series 3) 
over the same twenty-five-year period. Before 1982, the durable goods balance 
fluctuated  widely  in  response  to real  exchange  rate  movements,  while  the 
telecommunications equipment balance remained essentially stable for fifteen 
years. This disparity was particularly  evident between  1980 and  1982, when 
the (scaled) durable trade balance fell from 9.2 percent to -0.2  percent in 
response to a 32 percent real appreciation of the dollar, while the (scaled) tele- 
communications equipment trade balance actually rose modestly. After  1982, 
both trade balances deteriorated, but again their timing was not synchronized. 
As the dollar began  its real  depreciation  in  1986, the durables trade deficit 
narrowed sharply, while the telecommunications equipment deficit merely sta- 
bilized. 
Trade balance movements in telecommunications equipment also are distin- 
guished from trends in other leading-edge industries. Figure 5.2 compares (un- 
scaled) trade  balances  for telecommunications equipment and a  basket  of 
advanced-technology products between  1982 and 1993 (series 4 and 3.’ Tele- 
7. Since 1982, the Department of  Commerce has tracked trade balances for a basket of’ products 
that employ leading-edge technologies. The basket covers the following sectors: advanced materi- 
als. aerospace, biotechnology, electronics, flexible manufacturing, information and communica- 
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Fig. 5.2  Telecommunications  equipment and high-technology  trade balances 
(in millions of current dollars). Left axis: high-technology  products; right axis: 
telecommunications  equipment. 
Sources: US.  General Accounting Office (1992); US.  Industrial Outlook (1982-94);  Statistical 
Abstract of  the United States (I  994). 
communications equipment is distinguished by both the level and the direction 
of change in its trade balance. While the United States maintained a surplus 
in advanced technology products throughout the decade, telecommunications 
equipment was  consistently  in  deficit  after  1982. The advanced-technology 
trade surplus also grew slightly over the decade (in nominal terms), while the 
telecommunications equipment trade deficit instead widened sharply. 
5.  I .2  Comparisons of Intraindustry Trends 
While  telecommunications equipment distinguished  itself from aggregate 
and sectoral trade trends, it also exhibited substantial intraindustry  variation 
in the timing  and persistence of trade deficits. Telecommunications  systems 
consist of three interconnected components: terminals, transmission lines, and 
switches. Terminals are used to send and receive voice and data communica- 
tions.  Terminal equipment includes  handsets, modems, facsimile machines, 
and simple key telephone sets that allow access to multiple lines and services 
such as call forwarding and conferencing. Network equipment collectively re- 
fers to switches and transmission  lines. Switches act like the central nervous 
system of the network by controlling call routing across telephone exchanges 
and service carriers.8 Switches may be located either in a telephone company’s 
premises (central office switches, or COSs) or in a customer’s facilities (private 
branch exchanges, or PBXs). Transmission lines complete the network system 
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U.S. trade in terminal equipment (in millions of 1982 dollars) 
by  connecting individual switches. Transmission can occur either along wires 
and optical fibers (wireline communication) or over the electromagnetic spec- 
trum by microwave, radio, and satellites (wireless communication). 
The United States has run a persistent trade deficit in terminal equipment 
since  the  effective  inception  of  international  telecommunications  trade  in 
1975, as summarized in figure 5.3 (series 6-8).  The sharpest deterioration in 
this trade balance occurred between 1980 and 1986, when the terminal equip- 
ment deficit ballooned in real terms from $30 to $820 million before narrowing 
slightly in later years. These movements were driven overwhelmingly by  im- 
ports, which grew from less than $50 million during the late 1970s to exceed 
$850 million by  1986. As a share of domestic consumption, imports rose from 
less than 2 percent during the mid-1970s to 11.2 percent by  1981 and to 55.3 
percent by  1986 (series 9). Through this period, Japan  supplied between  37 
and 43 percent of terminal equipment imports, making it the largest foreign 
supplier to the U.S. market (U.S. International Trade Commission  1984, table 
H-14). After 1985, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea displaced Japan to 
become major suppliers to the United States of  generic telephone equipment. 
In contrast to import trends, US. terminal equipment exports remained stable 
and below $60 million until the late  1980s, when  development of  specialty, 
software-intensive equipment and deregulation of  European telecommunica- 
tions markets allowed U.S. exports to grow gradually to $200-$250  million. 125  Regulation and Telecommunications Trade 
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Source: Electronic Market Data Book (1975-94). 
U.S. trade in network equipment (in millions of 1982 dollars) 
After 1990, US. imports of (generic) terminal equipment outstripped exports 
of (specialty) terminal equipment by  a four-to-one ratio. 
Network equipment, by contrast, maintained a relatively small trade surplus 
through  1982, as summarized in figure 5.4 (series 10-12).  Between  1982 and 
1984, however, the United States abruptly became a substantial net importer 
as real imports more than tripled from $319 to $983 million and imports dou- 
bled as a share of network equipment purchases to reach  16.3 percent (series 
13). Since 1984, growth in imports and import penetration has been more mod- 
est, reflecting a solidification of network equipment supply relations. Canada's 
Northern Telecom has remained  the largest supplier of  US. network equip- 
ment imports (with a 57.9 percent share in 1989),  reflecting the early foothold 
that the firm achieved after introducing digital technology switches in  1977. 
The remainder of the U.S. import market has been divided almost evenly be- 
tween Japan's NEC, Fujitsu, Toshiba, and Hitachi (with a combined share of 
18.8 percent) and Europe's  Siemens and Ericsson (with a combined share of 
15.5 per~ent).~  Throughout this period, U.S. real exports of network equipment 
remained relatively  stable and did not begin growing until after  1987, in re- 
sponse  to  European  telecommunications  deregulation.  This delayed  export 
growth, reinforced by dampened import growth after 1984, helped return the 
9. My calculations, based on data in Vietor and Yoffie (1993, 162). Shares sum to less than 100 
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Average trade balances for major telecommunications equipment 
United States to a small trade surplus in network equipment beginning in 1988, 
although it continued to be a large net importer from Japan. 
5.1.3  Comparisons of Regional Trends 
The perception of the telecommunications equipment trade imbalance as a 
“US.-Japan problem” can be attributed to the industry’s third transformation. 
In the early 1980s, the United States was virtually the only major producer of 
telecommunications  equipment to become an overall net importer-a  shift that 
was precipitated  largely by its trade relations with Japan. Only later did pat- 
terns in US-Japan trade spread to U.S.-Asian and Japanese-European trade. 
Figure 5.5 compares trade balances  among ten major telecommunications 
equipment producers between 1978 and 1987. The countries divide themselves 
naturally into three groups. The first group consists of the United States and 
Japan, which experienced the largest changes in their industry trade balances. 
During this decade, the United States moved from a surplus of $184 million to 
a deficit exceeding $1.5 billion, while Japan’s trade surplus grew from $1.0 to 
$2.8 billion. The second group includes smaller Asian producers (Hong Kong, 
South Korea, and Taiwan), which became net exporters by supplying generic 
terminal equipment to the United States in large volume after the mid-1980s. 
The final group consists of European producers and Canada, which maintained 
comparatively  stable trade  balances over the decade. An  exception  was the 
United Kingdom, which began telecommunications  deregulation in 1984 and, 
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Source: US.  Industrial Outlook ( 1978-94). 
Note: “Other Asia” consists of  Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan. 
U.S. telecommunications equipment regional trade balances (in 
By disaggregating  trade balances regionally, figure 5.6 (series 14-25)  con- 
firms the initial uniqueness  of the US.-Japan imbalance. Through 1990, the 
largest US. regional  trade deficit  was with Japan. Between 1982 and  1989, 
Japanese imports grew from $356 to $1.62 billion, while US.  exports to Japan 
rose from just $25.0 to $236.4 million. The eventual narrowing of  the U.S.- 
Japan trade deficit stemmed not from subsequent growth in U.S. exports but 
instead  from  the  substitution  of  terminal  equipment imports from  smaller 
Asian producers-principally  Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan. Import 
growth rates from these three sources had actually matched or exceeded Japa- 
nese import growth since 1984, but import levels remained constrained by the 
residential effects of industrialized countries’ regulatory barriers that had con- 
fined equipment producers to their normal markets. US.-Japan trade also dis- 
tinguished itself from the relative stability of the U.S. regional trade balance 
with Europe and Canada. Historically, the United States maintained a moderate 
trade  surplus  with Europe, which  widened  in the  late  1980s, following  the 
deregulation  of  major European telecommunications markets.  The United 
States historically maintained a moderate deficit with Canada, which widened 
after 1982, following the deregulation of the United States market.“’ 
10.  Trade  with  both  of  these  regions  has  been  concentrated  overwhelmingly  in  network 
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Fig. 5.7  Japanese telecommunications equipment regional trade balances (in 
millions of 1982 dollars) 
Source: Japan Electronics Almanac ( 198 1-84). 
The initial uniqueness of the U.S.-Japan imbalance is reinforced by compar- 
ing it to Japan’s trade with Europe in this industry, as summarized in figure 5.7 
(series 26 and 27).” Prior to the mid-1980s Japan’s widening industry surplus 
was driven almost entirely by trade with the United States. The sharpest early 
growth in Japan’s surplus also coincided  with final deregulation of the  U.S. 
telecommunications market between  1982 and 1984. Through 1985, by com- 
parison, Japan maintained only a small trade  surplus with  Europe. Later, as 
Europe gradually began deregulating telecommunications, Japanese-European 
trade began to follow Japanese-U.S. patterns, with a four-year delay. By the 
early  1990s, the  United  States  and  Europe  were  experiencing  comparably 
sized trade industry deficits with Japan. 
5.1.4  Criteria for Explaining Trade Patterns 
The distinct characteristics of telecommunications equipment trade patterns, 
summarized in figures 5.1-5.7,  establish three criteria for a theory to explain 
the industry’s trade dynamics. First, the fact that telecommunications  equip- 
ment  trade  patterns  diverged  abruptly  from  general  merchandise,  durable 
goods, and advanced-technology trends after 1982 necessitates an explanation 
that is industry specific. Second, variation in the timing and persistence of the 
deficit across equipment categories implies that  the explanation should take 
account of intraindustry differences in demand and technology features. Fi- 
I  I. US.  and Japanese industry  classifications differ slightly, leading to discrepancies between 
thc series depicted in figs. 5.6 and 5.7. Comparable data for Japan-Canada and Japan-Asia tele- 
communications equipment trade were unavailable. 129  Regulation and Telecommunications Trade 
nally, the fact that these trends initially were peculiar to U.S. trade with Japan 
implies that an explanation should emphasize interactions between these coun- 
tries. At the same time, because these trends eventually spread to U.S.-Asian 
and Japanese-European trade, a complete explanation should also include ref- 
erence to those countries’ telecommunications markets and institutions. Sec- 
tions 5.2 and 5.3 adopt these criteria to explain the origins and evolution of the 
U.S. telecommunications equipment industry’s trade imbalance. 
5.2  Trade Conflicts in Terminal Equipment 
This section assesses how domestic market structure and procurement prac- 
tices in the United States and Japan shaped bilateral trade in terminal equip- 
ment.  Terminal  equipment  consists  primarily  of  low-technology,  labor- 
intensive  products,  including telephone  handsets, answering  machines,  and 
modems. Economic barriers  to entering terminal  equipment production  are 
minimal, as a result of rapid technology  diffusion, minimal scale economies, 
and weak demand complementarities.  However, through the late 1970s,  regula- 
tory barriers effectively excluded all but a few domestic suppliers in both U.S. 
and  Japanese markets.  The result  was  that  terminal  equipment imports  re- 
mained below 2 percent of equipment purchases in both countries, despite the 
fact that U.S. labor costs were twelve times and Japanese labor costs six times 
higher than wages prevailing in Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan. 
U.S. deregulation  lowered entry barriers in stages between  1977 and 1984 
and was followed  by  a series of  sharp jumps in terminal equipment import 
penetration,  which eventually  rose to exceed  85 percent.  Japan  initially  ac- 
counted for the largest share of these imports, reflecting its head start in in- 
stalled capacity that had been exclusively supplying the world’s second largest 
captive telecommunications market.  The conclusion of  U.S.  deregulation  in 
1984, coupled with  a  sharp rise in Japanese labor costs between  1985 and 
1988, enabled Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan to begin large-scale pro- 
duction of terminal equipment and eventually to displace Japan as leading ex- 
porters to the United States. Deregulation of the Japanese market after 1981, 
by comparison, had relatively little effect on the bilateral imbalance in terminal 
equipment.  While  Japanese  imports  from  lower-cost  Asian  sources  rose 
sharply, high U.S. labor costs continued to limit U.S. exports to a small range 
of specialty, software-intensive terminal equipment. 
5.2.1  Economic Barriers to Entry 
The economics of terminal equipment manufacturing  traditionally  did not 
erect perceptible barriers to entry. To begin, economies of scale were exhausted 
at  very  low rates  of  production.  Huber (1987, 17-7) found that  US. firms 
reached minimum efficient scale with as little as 3 percent market share, and 
Brock (1981, 235) confirmed  that  scale economies for terminal  equipment 
were comparable to those for any other small electrical appliances. Production 130  Andrew R. Dick 
cost penalties therefore were unlikely to deter potential entrants from entering 
at a small scale. 
Lack of access to manufacturing technologies also did not erect an economic 
barrier to entry in this industry. Technology for terminal equipment had grown 
increasingly standardized as a result of two forces. The first was the traditional 
routinization and labor intensification of manufacturing methods as the prod- 
uct cycle progressed, described by Vernon (1966).‘* The second was technol- 
ogy dissemination  among firms that was hastened by AT&T’s court-imposed 
obligation in 1956 to license its patents to all applicants at a “reasonable roy- 
alty.” AT&T licenses proved to be particularly important to the development 
of Japan’s telecommunications industry (Baughcum  1986, 83). 
Finally, terminal equipment’s inherent simplicity lessened possible barriers 
to entry from the demand side. Because terminal equipment required little cus- 
tomization or after-sale service, there was no economic necessity for the loca- 
tion of consumption to be tied geographically  to the location of production. 
The position of terminal equipment as the final node in the telecommunica- 
tions system would also facilitate entry. Each terminal instrument was linked 
to a network switch, rather than directly to other terminal equipment, thereby 
removing any technical necessity to assure complete uniformity among indi- 
vidual products. 
The absence of economic barriers to entry has direct implications for indus- 
try structure, contracting practices,  and foreign trade in terminal equipment. 
First, the U.S. market should  have been  able to support  a large number of 
competitive suppliers. In practice, however, one firm-Western  Electric-sup- 
plied over 85 percent of domestic terminal equipment demand. Second, non- 
discriminatory contracting should have been economically viable. In practice, 
however, terminal equipment was sold through exclusive contracts based  on 
long-term supply relations. Finally, in an industry where economic barriers to 
entry were minimal, production locales should have been determined by rela- 
tive factor costs. In 1975, average hourly compensation for manufacturing pro- 
duction employees was $6.36 in the United States, which compared with $3.05 
in Japan and between  $0.34 and $0.76 among smaller Asian producers  (fig. 
5.8, series 28-32).13 Despite these substantial labor cost differentials, however, 
imported terminal equipment accounted for less than 2 percent of the U.S. (and 
Japanese) markets through the mid- 1970s. In the absence of economic entry 
barriers, an explanation lies elsewhere for the U.S. terminal equipment indus- 
I?.  As for many electronics products, the product life cycle for most telecommunications equip- 
ment involves a race to innovate leading-edge products followed by a race to routinize manufactur- 
ing processes to transform a proprietary device into a standardized commodity. 
13. While time-series data on international labor costs are available only for a manufacturing 
composite, for at least one year these data are closely correlated in the cross section with compen- 
sation costs for electric and electronic equipment manufacturing. In 1983, average hourly compen- 
sation for this sector was $11.90 in the United States (compared with $12.10 for all manufactur- 
ing), $5.54 in  Japan ($6.13). $1.29 in Korea ($1.20), and $1.31 in Taiwan ($1.27) (International 
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Source: International  Comparisons of Hourly  Compensation  Costs for Production  Workers in 
Manufacturing (1988, 1993). 
Note: Compensation includes pay for time worked, other direct pay, social insurance, and private 
benefits. 
Compensation costs for production workers in manufacturing 
try’s extraordinarily high seller concentration, its reliance on exclusive supply 
contracts, and the apparent interdependence between supply and relative costs. 
5.2.2  Regulatory Barriers to Entry in the United States 
Until its divestiture on 1 January 1984,  AT&T was both the largest manufac- 
turer and the largest purchaser of telecommunications equipment in the United 
States. As the parent company for the Bell Telephone system, AT&T supplied 
all long-distance service through its Long Lines Department, while its twenty- 
four  regional  Bell  operating companies (BOCs) supplied  local  service for 
85 percent of  the U.S. market.14 AT&T’s  manufacturing  subsidiary, Western 
Electric, supplied nearly all the entire Bell system’s equipment requirements. 
Equipment was supplied under exclusive contracts, which established a multi- 
billion-dollar captive market for Western Electric. AT&T also owned the Bell 
Laboratories,  which worked closely with the BOCs and Western  Electric  to 
develop and commercialize new equipment. This monopolistic  market struc- 
ture, which had evolved over decades of industry consolidation, was officially 
sanctioned by the Department of Justice in a 1956 consent decree that settled 
an antitrust complaint against AT&T.15 
14. The remainder of  the local market was served by a large number of independent telephone 
companies, of which GTE was the largest. 
IS.  The antitrust complaint charged AT&T with  a conspiracy to restrain  trade in  telephone 
service and charged AT&T’s equipment subsidiary, Western Electric, with monopolizing the mar- 
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Telecommunications was regulated at both the federal and state levels. The 
Federal  Communications Commission (FCC) had jurisdiction for approving 
charges for interstate and international service, while states’ public utility com- 
missions (PUCs) set intrastate charges. Both agencies used traditional rate of 
return regulation,  which  set a maximum allowable profit  rate for AT&T on 
telephone calls and equipment sales. Regulators also authorized the terms un- 
der which telephone service would be provided. Competitive entry was directly 
controlled by a regulatory mandate that “[nlo equipment, apparatus, circuit or 
device not furnished by  the telephone  company shall be attached to or con- 
nected with the facilities furnished by the telephone company” (Brock 1981, 
239). The effect of this mandate was to prevent customers from legally pur- 
chasing  a telephone  from an independent company  and then attaching  it to 
AT&T’s telecommunications network. While some unauthorized  attachments 
did occur, AT&T aggressively monitored the number of telephones attached to 
each line, and the company penalized violators by seizing independent equip- 
ment or denying telephone service. 
Entry was indirectly controlled further by regulations requiring subscribers 
to lease their terminal equipment from their  local BOC, which  in turn pur- 
chased the equipment exclusively from Western Electric. By tying telephone 
equipment to service, AT&T forced potential equipment suppliers to establish 
their own local telephone company to service their customers. State regulators 
generally declined to license new competitors in local telephone markets, and 
substantial economic barriers to entry existed in providing telephone  service 
owing to  large network economies. The result was that entry into telephone 
service was a roundabout and usually unprofitable route for entry into terminal 
equipment manufacturing.  AT&T’s  tie-in  strategy  and  exclusive  supply  ar- 
rangement with the BOCs therefore left little scope for competition in terminal 
equipment, from either domestic or foreign sources. 
It  is  critical  to  underscore  that  telecommunications regulation  provided 
AT&T with both the incentive to exclude competitors and the means to control 
equipment distribution.  In the absence of  a regulatory cap on its profit rate, 
AT&T could have charged (near) monopoly  prices for telephone  service. In 
an unregulated  market,  therefore,  neither a tying arrangement nor exclusive 
contracting would have extended AT&T’s market power from telephone service 
to the terminal equipment market because the monopoly profit could have been 
collected  only  once. Nor would  an  unregulated  monopolist  have chosen to 
manufacture  terminal  equipment unless  it were the minimum-cost  producer 
since a mandated purchase and leasing scheme would only have reduced the 
maximum profit that AT&T could extract from its (near) monopoly  in tele- 
First. as noted earlier, AT&T was required to license its patents on reasonable and nondiscnmina- 
tory terms. Second, AT&T was required to confine its activities to regulated common carrier ser- 
vice  in the domestic market. Finally, Western Electric was permitted to manufacture equipment 
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phone service. In this situation, therefore, AT&T would have had no incentive 
to insist on leasing equipment to subscribers or to insist that its regional op- 
erating companies purchase their equipment under exclusive arrangements, un- 
less these could be justified for purely cost-saving reasons. 
But, under federal and state regulation, AT&T’s  allowable profit was con- 
strained by the size of its rate base. Profits therefore depended on the firm’s 
costs, and higher costs implied larger revenues and greater allowable profits, 
provided that demand was inelastic. A regulated AT&T therefore would profit 
by  extending  its (constrained)  monopoly  power from telephone  service into 
the terminal equipment market by  using sales under the tie-in and exclusive 
supply contract to expand its rate base. Regulation thus enabled a telephone 
company that controlled terminal equipment to earn profits on its sale mice: 
once at the manufacturing  stage, by charging its subsidiaries  inflated prices, 
and then again as profit on the rate base for the local telephone company, which 
leased the equipment to subscribers. If the BOCs had been allowed to purchase 
equipment from competitive sources, in lieu of the exclusive supply contracts, 
AT&T’s downstream source of profit would have been eliminated by shrinkage 
of its rate base. And, if telephone subscribers had been permitted to purchase 
terminal equipment from competitive sources in lieu of the tie-in, both sources 
of AT&T profit would have been eliminated by shrinking the rate bases of both 
AT&T and the BOCs.Ih 
Facing these regulatory  incentives, AT&T vigorously  protected  its (near) 
monopoly by consistently opposing entrants’ attempts to liberalize regulations 
governing independent equipment attachments. The first attempt to challenge 
AT&T’s control over attachments to the network came in 1956 with the Hush- 
a-Phone case. The Hush-a-Phone  was a simple cuplike device that  snapped 
onto the end of  a telephone  to provide  speaking privacy  and shield out sur- 
rounding  noises. The manufacturer of  Hush-a-Phone  petitioned  the FCC to 
allow the attachment to be sold directly to telephone subscribers. AT&T vigor- 
ously opposed the petition, asserting that the device threatened network service 
quality. After protracted  legal battles, the FCC eventually sided with Hush-a- 
Phone but tailored its ruling narrowly to carve out an exception solely for this 
device. The potential effect of  the FCC ruling was dampened further when its 
implementation  was left to local telephone companies, which engaged in de- 
laying tactics for more than two decades before terminal equipment markets 
finally were opened to competition. 
16. AT&Tb tying of telephone equipment to service also facilitated nonlinear price discrimina- 
tion that would not have been feasible in the absence of regulation. Subscribers that attach a higher 
valuation to service tend to demand more telephones per line. To charge a higher effective price 
per call to those subscribers, nonlinear price discrimination would combine a relatively low rate 
for telephone service with a relatively high leasing fee for terminal equipment. Because this me- 
tered pricing scheme placed the largest price-cost  markup on the product  for which entry was 
easiest (terminal equipment), however, a formal tying arrangement was necessary to support price 
discrimination. Regulatory barriers to entry in local telephone service markets provided the means 
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AT&T repelled a second entry challenge in  1986. The Carterphone was a 
relatively simple attachment that converted telephone signals into radio signals 
for broadcast to a mobile radio/telephone. AT&T opposed the Carter Electric 
Company’s attempt to sell the attachment directly to final users. The FCC even- 
tually ruled in Carter’s favor but allowed AT&T to require purchasers of  the 
Carterphone  to lease a telephone-company-supplied  coupling device for the 
asserted purpose  of  protecting  the  network  from harm.  In  some cases, the 
charge for the protective device was as high as the monthly charge for basic 
telephone service (Brock  198  1, 242). This discriminatory fee was structured 
to make it uneconomical for Carter to sell its attachment except to subscribers 
with very large telephone systems. The result was that FCC policy continued 
to maintain entry barriers in most of the U.S. terminal equipment market. 
5.2.3 
Under increasing domestic political pressure, the FCC began a gradual pro- 
cess of opening terminal equipment markets to competition,  starting in the 
mid- 1970s.’’ An initial opportunity to lower regulatory barriers to entry came 
in October 1975 with the FCC’s first order registration program. The program 
sought to provide non-Bell equipment manufacturers with controlled access to 
AT&T’s subscriber network. The FCC proposed to test independents’ equip- 
ment, certify products  that posed  “no harm”  to network quality, and permit 
those products to be attached legally to telephone lines by subscribers. In prac- 
tice, however, the program did little to facilitate entry. Its narrow  scope ex- 
cluded the majority of terminal equipment (telephones, key sets, and PBXs), 
and AT&T and its subsidiary BOCs succeeded in delaying implementation of 
the modest deregulation order for two years. 
The first meaningful  deregulation of  the U.S. terminal equipment  market 
occurred in October  1977 with the adoption of the second order registration 
program. The program permitted telephone subscribers to attach directly most 
types of non-Western  Electric terminal equipment (including telephones, key 
sets, and PBXs) to the AT&T network. Competitive entry quickly followed this 
partial lowering of regulatory entry barriers, confirming that, in the absence of 
economic barriers, supply would be determined by  relative factor costs. Be- 
tween  1977 and 1978, real imports of terminal equipment jumped 30 percent 
(from $11.2 to $44.1 million),  and import penetration  rose from  1.4 to 4.5 
percent. During this period, Japan supplied approximately 45 percent of U.S. 
terminal  equipment imports, amounting  to just over 2  percent of total  U.S. 
purchases (U.S. International Trade Commission 1984, table H- 14). While im- 
ports grew rapidly, market access remained  limited by  an FCC requirement 
that subscribers notify their local telephone company when they attached non- 
Western Electric equipment. As with the earlier entry threat from Carterphone, 
Deregulation of the U.S.  Market 
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AT&T used this regulatory  loophole to monitor attachments  and to charge a 
discriminatory  fee to subscribers using independent equipment. Surveillance 
proved to be very costly, however, and compliance rates with the FCC require- 
ment were estimated at only 20 percent, indicating that the second order regis- 
tration program  did in fact begin to  lower regulatory  entry  barriers  (Brock 
1981, 251). 
Entry barriers were lowered again in 1980 when the FCC removed terminal 
equipment from rate-of-return  regulation and required AT&T to sell terminal 
equipment  to  telephone  subscribers  directly  rather  than  indirectly  leasing 
equipment through the BOCs.Is The immediate effect of the FCC order was to 
remove terminal equipment from AT&T’s and the BOCs’ rate bases. Because 
rate-of-return  regulation had been the sole rationale for AT&T’s exclusionary 
practice  of  tying  telephone  equipment  and  service,  deregulation  therefore 
eliminated AT&T’s incentive to monopolize the local terminal equipment mar- 
ket. The result was a second surge in U.S. terminal equipment imports. Be- 
tween  1980 and 198 1, real imports of terminal equipment rose from $56.2 to 
$132.5  million,  and imports increased  as a share of  domestic  consumption 
from 5.9 to 11.2 percent in the same year (fig. 5.3 above, series 8 and 9).  Japan’s 
import share rose to 54 percent during this period, and its share of the U.S. 
market increased to just over 6 percent (U.S. International Trade Commission 
1984, table H-14). 
The final-and  furthest-reaching-deregulation  order was issued in August 
1982, with the announcement of the Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ) as 
an out-of-court  settlement to a 1974 antitrust suit against AT&T.Iy Under the 
terms of  the MFJ, AT&T agreed to fully divest itself from the local BOCs by 
1 January  1984. The centerpiece of  the divestiture order was the severing of 
exclusive equipment supply contracts that had prevailed for five decades be- 
tween AT&T  and the BOCs. After  1982, the  local  telephone  companies- 
which the MFJ now grouped into seven regional holding companies (RHCs)- 
were  permitted to purchase  terminal  equipment directly  from independent 
manufacturers. Henceforth, all equipment contracts involving AT&T were re- 
quired to be negotiated on arm’s-length, nonpreferential terms. The MFJ also 
prohibited the RHCs from vertically integrating upstream to supply their inter- 
nal demand for telephone equipment. By divorcing the local carriers from their 
former parent  company,  requiring  competitive  contracting,  and  precluding 
self-supply, the MFJ removed the last remaining regulatory barriers to entry in 
the U.S. terminal equipment market.’” 
The conclusion of deregulation precipitated another surge in terminal equip- 
ment imports. Between 1982 and  1984, real imports jumped from $136.0 to 
18. The order resulted from the FCC’s Computer I1 Inquiry. 
19. The agreement is known as the Modification of Final Judgment because  it modified  the 
20. Under the MFJ’s terms, AT&T was allowed to continue producing its own equipment for 
terms of the original consent decree that the industry had operated under since 1956. 
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$466.7 million, and import penetration tripled from 11.6 to 37.5 percent (fig. 
5.3 above, series 8 and 9). During this period, Japan remained the largest for- 
eign  supplier of  terminal equipment in the United  States with a  14 percent 
share of all purchases, reflecting its 50 percent manufacturing labor cost ad- 
vantage. However, Japan's share of U.S. imports also started to decline, falling 
from 54 percent in 1981 to 46 percent in 1982 and then 37 percent in  1983 as 
smaller, lower-cost Asian producers began large-scale manufacturing of termi- 
nal equipment (U.S. International Trade Commission 1984, table H-14). 
Telecommunications regulation in the United States and most other industri- 
alized countries had historically constrained terminal equipment manufactur- 
ers worldwide to supply only their local market. For Hong Kong, South Korea, 
and Taiwan, which had small domestic telecommunications  markets, foreign 
regulatory barriers precluded expansion of capacity to exploit their consider- 
able manufacturing labor cost advantage (fig. 5.8 above, series 28 and 30-31). 
Final deregulation of  the U.S. terminal equipment market in  1982, however, 
opened a potential marketplace of 93 million telephone lines (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 199  1, table 1). This market opportu- 
nity prompted large-scale investments in telecommunications equipment man- 
ufacturing  in Hong  Kong,  South Korea and Taiwan, which permitted  rapid 
growth in export  sales to the U.S. market. In  1979, the three countries  ac- 
counted for just 8.5 percent of  U.S. imports of  terminal equipment (and 0.3 
percent of  U.S. consumption). By  1982, their import share had risen to 28.4 
percent (3.3 percent of U.S. consumption), and, by  1983, it had reached 45.3 
percent (15.4 percent of U.S. consumption) (US. International Trade Commis- 
sion 1984, table H-l4).*' 
Between  1985 and  1988, Japanese  manufacturing  labor costs jumped 82 
percent, bringing them to within 91 percent of US.  rates (fig. 5.8 above, series 
28 and 29). In response, terminal equipment production continued to shift to- 
ward  Hong  Kong,  South  Korea,  and Taiwan, which  maintained  between  a 
seven-to-one and ten-to-one labor cost advantage. After  1985, U.S. imports 
from the rest of Asia grew nine times as rapidly as imports from Japan (series 
16 and 22). The import surge after 1985 was short-lived, however, as real U.S. 
terminal  equipment demand  peaked  in  1986. Beginning  in  1987, real  con- 
sumption began falling in response to saturation of the U.S. market after five 
years of imports of  generic terminal equipment  from Asia. Thus, while real 
import growth slowed appreciably after 1986, when combined with an average 
8.2 percent annual decline in real consumption between 1986 and 1992, import 
penetration rates continued rising and eventually exceeded 90 percent in this 
market (series 9):. 
71. Individual country import shares in  1979 (and  1983) were as follows: Hong Kong,  1.8 
percent (14.8 percent); South Korea, 3.4 percent (10.3 percent); and Taiwan, 3.2 percent (20.2 
percent). 
72. Real consumption of terminal equipment fell from $1.54 billion in  1986 to $961 million in 
1992. Import penetration during this period  grew from 55.3 to 88.1 percent (Electronic Marker 
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5.2.4 
Japan’s telecommunications equipment market closely resembled its Ameri- 
can counterpart, the result of common economic fundamentals and very simi- 
lar regulatory structures. In 1952, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) was 
established as a publicly owned monopoly supplier of telephone service. Regu- 
lations by Japan’s Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications  (MPT) required 
telephone subscribers  to  lease their terminal  equipment directly  from NTT, 
which purchased equipment under a preferential agreement from a small fam- 
ily of suppliers headed by the Nippon Electronic Corporation  (NEC).23  NTT 
was given exclusive authority by the MPT to approve communications equip- 
ment for attachment to its network. NTT established technical specifications 
for equipment that were based on specific design criteria rather than general 
performance standards  and wrote these  specifications  to favor NEC family 
members. NTT’s certification procedures  were complex and time consuming, 
and independent equipment manufacturers frequently faced difficulties in con- 
vincing NTT to divulge even what the technical criteria were. Further, for more 
sophisticated  terminal  equipment such as key telephones,  separate approval 
was required for each individual installation. 
These regulatory barriers and preferential contracting practices (supported 
by  regulatory  authority)  effectively  curtailed  entry  into terminal  equipment 
manufacturing. Few Japanese manufacturers that were not associated with the 
NEC family supplied equipment to NTT. Japanese imports of terminal equip- 
ment  from the United States totaled just $121,000 in  1978 (U.S. Congress 
1980, 27). The strongest evidence of regulatory barriers, however, is found in 
the fact that Japan’s overall  import penetration  ratio for terminal  equipment 
was only  1.2 percent in  1978, despite Japan’s  six-to-one manufacturing  labor 
cost disadvantage relative to small producers in Hong Kong, South Korea, and 
Taiwan  (fig.  5.8  above,  series  29-32)  (Japan Electronics Almanac  1984, 
table 7). 
Deregulation  of Japanese telecommunications commenced four years after 
initial liberalization in the United States. In January 1981, the Japanese market 
was partially  deregulated  to permit telephone  subscribers  to purchase some 
terminal equipment directly from independent manufacturers. However, NTT 
retained its monopoly for supplying the first telephone in a subscriber’s prem- 
ises and retained its authority to inspect and certify independent equipment for 
compliance with technical  standards before it could be connected to the net- 
work. Shortly thereafter, however, certification procedures  were significantly 
liberalized by NTT’s decision to accept test data from independent manufactur- 
ers to expedite certification of their  product^.'^ After 198  1,  NTT approved most 
Regulation and Deregulation in Japan 
23. The NEC family included NEC, Fujitsu, Hitachi, and Oh.  An exception to the mandatory 
equipment leases applied to large PBXs, where NTT allowed direct dealings between equipment 
suppliers and telephone subscribers. 
24. NTT’s revised procedures were pursuant to the Understanding on the Interconnect Market 
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requests for attachments of independent terminal equipment (U.S. General Ac- 
counting Office  1983, 15). Despite deregulation,  however, the U.S. share of 
the Japanese market rose just marginally  to  1.1 percent  (Japan Electronics 
Almanac 1984, table 7; US.  International Trade Commission  1984, table H- 
14; U.S. Industrial Outlook 1984). While U.S. export continued to face some 
regulatory barriers to entering the Japanese market, the primary obstacle re- 
mained high U.S. manufacturing labor costs. For this reason, exports of termi- 
nal  equipment to Japan  were  limited  to software-intensive  devices  such as 
video conferencing and voice processing that required skilled assembly. 
Deregulation of Japan’s terminal equipment market was completed in April 
1985, amid trade frictions with the United States and pressure from large Japa- 
nese  telecommunications users  seeking lower charges.  The NTT Company 
Law and the Telecommunications Business Law were enacted to institute three 
regulatory  reforms.  First, NTT’s monopoly  over  subscribers’  first telephone 
was rescinded. Second, authority for equipment approval was removed from 
NTT and placed in an independent standards board, the Japan Approval Insti- 
tute for Telecommunications, which instituted simplified and transparent certi- 
fication procedures  (Choy  1995). Finally, NTT was converted into a semipri- 
vate corporation subject to competition from independent  telephone  service 
providers that were not tied to the NEC equipment family. 
Despite apparent compliance by NTT with each reform, removal of these 
final regulatory barriers again had little effect on US. terminal equipment ex- 
ports to Japan.15 That the United States was at a 50 percent manufacturing 
labor cost disadvantage remained the central impediment limiting its exports 
to just  10 percent  of Japan’s total purchases  of foreign terminal  equipment. 
While  U.S. exports rose by 30 percent after Japanese  deregulation,  they re- 
mained less than $5 million in total. By contrast, Japanese deregulation spurred 
rapid growth  in terminal  equipment production  among smaller Asian coun- 
tries, where manufacturing labor costs were one-quarter to one-seventh. After 
1985, Japanese imports of terminal equipment from South Korea, Hong Kong, 
and Taiwan increased  160 percent annually. Asian imports accounted for 88 
percent of total Japanese purchases of foreign terminal equipment and in abso- 
lute level were nine times greater than U.S. imports (Japan  Electronics Alma- 
nac 1989, 165-67). 
5.2.5  Summary 
Regulatory  policy played  a dominant role in shaping terminal  equipment 
markets in the United States and Japan. Despite minimal economic barriers to 
entry,  regulatory  barriers  created and protected  local  monopolies that sup- 
pressed competitive entry. The result was that, through the mid- 1970s, imports 
constituted less than 2 percent of U.S. and Japanese terminal equipment pur- 
75. U.S.  telecommunications companies generally attested to Japanese compliance with  the 
1985 reforms (US.  General Accounting Office 1988, 22-23). 139  Regulation and Telecommunications Trade 
chases, despite substantial  manufacturing  labor cost disadvantages  in  both 
countries relative to low-age Asian sources. Deregulation occurred first in the 
United States, starting in 1977 and culminating in the 1982-84  dissolution of 
the Bell system. Deregulation  followed in Japan between  1981 and  1985. In 
both countries, imports from comparatively  lower-cost sources grew rapidly 
following deregulation. Japan benefited from U.S. deregulation and gained a 
substantial market share, only to be supplanted in the second half of the 1980s 
by  still lower-cost Asian  suppliers.  In contrast,  after Japanese deregulation, 
high factor costs continued to limit U.S. terminal equipment exports to a small 
range of complex, specialty products. The combined effect of deregulation in 
the US.  and Japanese markets, therefore, was to create a substantial US.  trade 
deficit immediately following the opening of those markets to competition. 
5.3  Trade Conflicts in Network Equipment 
This section assesses how domestic market structure and procurement prac- 
tices in the United States and Japan shaped bilateral trade in network equip- 
ment. In both countries, trade historically had been limited by the presence of 
domestic monopoly suppliers with preferential ties to local service providers. 
This market structure was favored by the coexistence of substantial scale econ- 
omies in production and network economies in demand. These economic entry 
barriers were reinforced  by regulatory  policies that favored exclusive supply 
relations and set design standards to exclude competitors. Economic and regu- 
latory barriers together limited network equipment imports to less than 5 per- 
cent of the U.S. market and less than 1 percent of the Japanese market through 
the late 1970s (Electronic  Market Data Book 1979; Japan Electronics Almanac 
1984, table 7). 
Entry barriers into the U.S. network equipment market were lowered by two 
complementary events. Together, they created a window of market contestabil- 
ity. The first event was the introduction of digital switches in 1977 by Canada’s 
Northern Telecom, which offered substantial cost and quality advantages over 
AT&T’s  installed  analog switching  system. Digital technology  threatened  to 
erode economic barriers to entry by depreciating AT&T’s sunk investments in 
its analog network. The second event was the Modification of Final Judgment 
in  1982, which split the Bell system. This regulatory reform directly under- 
mined economic barriers  to entry by proactively  severing AT&T’s exclusive 
equipment supply contracts with local telephone companies. Entry by Cana- 
dian and Japanese network  equipment imports quickly  followed  the  MFJ’s 
adoption. In Japan, by contrast, economic barriers remained largely in place as 
a result of  NTT’s decision  to delay adoption  of  digital switches  in its local 
network, even as Japanese equipment producers were beginning to export digi- 
tal technology.  Japanese deregulation  in  1985 also failed  to encourage entry 
as it merely sanctioned competitive contracting without proactively severing 
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practices that persisted after deregulation explain why entry by Japanese (and 
Canadian)  network  equipment  imports  quickly  followed  U.S.  deregulation 
while U.S. exports responded only weakly to Japanese deregulation. 
5.3.1  Economic Barriers to Entry 
Network equipment differs importantly from terminal equipment in its tech- 
nology and demand characteristics. The practical effect of these differences is 
that, while terminal equipment markets  and contracting  could be  structured 
competitively, network equipment’s technology and demand characteristics en- 
courage monopolistic market structures and preferential supply arrangements 
that discourage competitive entry. On the production side, substantial econo- 
mies of scale naturally limit the viable number of suppliers for network equip- 
ment. Variable material costs are low, while the fixed investment  associated 
with developing and fine-tuning a line of digital switches can require a five- to 
ten-year expenditure of $1-$1.5  billion (Hausman and Kohlberg  1989, 203). 
To recover this sunk expenditure, a firm requires between a 10 and a 15 percent 
share of the world market in switching equipment (Huber 1987, 14-18). Scale 
economies  have  permitted  the  survival  of  just seven  switch  manufacturers 
worldwide. Each firm historically enjoyed preferential procurement ties to its 
national telephone service carrier: AT&T (in the United States), NEC (Japan), 
Northern Telecom (Canada), Siemens (Germany), Ericsson (Sweden), Alcatel 
(France), and Plessey (the United Kingdom).2h 
On the demand side, network complementarities  imply that the network’s 
value  rises  proportionately  with  the number  of  interconnected  subscribers. 
These connections are made through central office switches, which act as the 
central nervous  system of the telephone network.  Routing telephone signals 
within an exchange and between exchanges requires that switches be able to 
communicate with one another. For this reason, telephone companies consis- 
tently rate compatibility with existing equipment as among the most important 
criteria when selecting their current supplier of network switches (U.S. Inter- 
national Trade Commission  1984, table 9). Because  switches are embedded 
with proprietary technologies, the simplest manner for a telephone company 
to ensure network compatibility is to limit procurement to a small number of 
suppliers. Accordingly, most telephone companies historically have contracted 
with no more than two suppliers for central office switches (Vietor and Yoffie 
1993, 138). Opportunities for recontracting occur infrequently because of the 
very long replacement cycle for switches. For example, the mean time between 
failures for AT&T’s 5ESS digital switch is approximately forty years, which 
implies that, once a contract is let, AT&T remains  strongly favored for up- 
grades and add-on purchases for four decades. Together, the technology and 
26. Economics of  scale also extend to other network equipment. For example, AT&T produces 
all its transmission equipment and fiber cable at a single plant in the United States, as it does for 
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demand characteristics of network switches strongly encourage purchasers to 
develop long-term, exclusive relations with their suppliers, with the result that 
traditional sources retain an advantage over potential entrants into a market. 
5.3.2  Regulatory Barriers to Entry in the United States 
Complementing these economic barriers to entry were US.  regulatory poli- 
cies that directly limited both import and export trade in network equipment. 
Prior to AT&T’s divestiture of the local BOCs in 1982, imports remained less 
than 8 percent of total purchases, and exports remained below  15 percent of 
industry shipments (series 11 and 13). 
Western  Electric retained  its effective monopoly  over network equipment 
supply through  1982.*’ During this time, AT&T accounted for more than 80 
percent of  U.S. purchases of central office equipment, and Western  Electric 
manufactured most of  the Bell system’s requirements. The remaining equip- 
ment was purchased from independent suppliers and then resold by Western 
Electric, acting as the BOCs’ exclusive procurement agent. The 1956 consent 
decree sanctioned these exclusive contracts and also required the BOCs to pro- 
vide Western Electric with advance notice of proposed equipment purchases. 
In a 1974 antitrust suit against AT&T, the government contended that this ar- 
rangement gave Western Electric sufficient lead time to preempt entry by inde- 
pendent suppliers. 
Regulatory policy further discouraged entry into the US. market by  estab- 
lishing unique network equipment design standards. The U.S. operated under 
the North American standard for most switching equipment, while the rest of 
the world generally followed  standards  developed by the International Tele- 
communications Union. The result was the balkanization of much of the world 
network equipment market for an extended period. Entering the U.S. market 
required that a foreign manufacturer adapt its equipment to conform with U.S. 
standards, at a cost ranging up to $500 million for central office switches. Of- 
ten, the difficulties of customizing switches for the U.S. market proved to be 
insurmountable. After investing several hundreds of millions of dollars trying 
to  adapt its switch for the United  States, France’s Alcatel abandoned its at- 
tempts at entry (Vietor and Yoffie 1993, 138-39). 
U.S. exports of network equipment likewise were limited by the 1956 con- 
sent decree, which confined AT&T to domestic, regulated markets. The decree 
sought to prevent AT&T from exploiting its status as a regulated service pro- 
vider to cross-subsidize export sales. While an unregulated firm could not ben- 
efit from subsidizing  some customers at the expense of others, AT&T could 
have profited by lowering its export price in the (unregulated) foreign market, 
shifting capital costs from those sales into its rate base, and then raising  its 
27. The early deregulation orders in  the  late  1970s (discussed in sec. 5.2) pertained only  to 
terminal equipment contracting and therefore did not disturb the preferential supply arrangements 
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regulated price to domestic customers in order to recoup forgone export reve- 
nues. To avoid this unintended consequence of domestic regulation, the con- 
sent decree simply precluded AT&T’s expansion into export markets. 
5.3.3  Deregulation of the U.S. Market 
In contrast to terminal equipment markets, where the removal of regulatory 
barriers  to entry was sufficient to allow international trade to occur, trade in 
network equipment required reductions in both regulatory and economic barri- 
ers. The coincidence of a major technological advance in network  switching 
and the forced severing of existing supply relations by regulators was responsi- 
ble for opening the U.S. network equipment market to international trade. 
In  1977, Northern Telecom introduced digital central office switches and 
sparked the first major shift in the Bell system’s procurement of network equip- 
ment.28  Digital switching represented a technological breakthrough. Compared 
with the Bell system’s installed network of analog equipment, digital techno- 
logies made possible unprecedented advances in the quality, speed, and capac- 
ity of call routing. According to Johnson (1993, lo), Northern Telecom’s lead 
in  digital  switching  was  so commanding that  it  was  able to  overcome  the 
BOCs’ traditional reluctance to deal with new suppliers. Between  1977 and 
1980, AT&T began integrating Northern Telecom switches into its network, 
and U.S. real imports rose by  150 percent (series 12). Northern Telecom also 
established a U.S. subsidiary, Northern Telecom International, to manufacture 
central office switches (COSs) locally. Despite Northern Telecom’s early suc- 
cess, however, import penetration  had reached just over 7 percent  by  1980, 
reflecting  the premium that remained on preserving compatibility within the 
existing analog network. 
Not until the MFJ fully deregulated the U.S. market in 1982 were regulatory 
and economic entry baniers eroded sufficiently to allow substantial US.  im- 
port trade in network equipment. Between 1982 and 1984, import penetration 
jumped from 7.8 to 16.3 percent as real imports more than tripled from $319.3 
to $983.3 million (fig. 5.4 above, series 12 and  13). The effect of this import 
surge in network equipment is seen clearly in the U.S. overall trade balance 
for telecommunications equipment. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 above (series 1 and 5) 
date  1982 as the beginning of  the secular decline in the industry’s aggregate 
trade balance. 
The 1982 MFJ has been described as “the greatest unilateral removal of  a 
non-tariff barrier in international trade history” (Robinson 199  1,438). Prior to 
this order, open markets for telecommunications  equipment were  limited to 
less than  15 percent  of  total  world  demand, according  to OECD estimates 
28. Until  1956, Northern Telecom had been controlled by AT&T and had manufactured equip- 
ment designed by Western Electric and the Bell Telephone Laboratories. When the 1956 consent 
decree forced Western Electric to divest its foreign operations, AT&T complied by selling North- 
ern Telecom to Bell Canada. Ironically, regulatory policy set the stage for the eventual entry of 
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(Noam  1989, 288). The breakup  of  AT&T  more  than  doubled  the  poten- 
tial market open to foreign equipment suppliers. Deregulation severed long- 
standing, exclusive  supply relations  at the time when  digital switches were 
just beginning to be integrated into the U.S. telecommunications network. The 
combination  of  AT&T’s  breakup and growing demand for digital switching 
thus established a window of contestability in the mid-1980s. This window 
provided network equipment suppliers with their first real opportunity to pene- 
trate the U.S. market. 
The terms of AT&T’s divestiture of  the local exchanges steered the newly 
created regional holding companies (RHCs) toward purchasing a greater frac- 
tion of their network equipment from foreign suppliers. The deregulation order 
did this in three ways. First, and most directly, AT&T was forced to sever its 
preferential supply relations between Western Electric and the BOCs. While 
Western Electric  (now renamed AT&T Technologies) was permitted  to con- 
tinue  selling network equipment,  all transactions had  to be  at arm’s-length, 
and the RHCs could not show preference for AT&T equipment when “other 
procurement conditions were roughly equal.” The divestiture also barred the 
RHCs from vertically integrating upstream to manufacture their own network 
equipment. Deregulation thus disrupted two obvious sources of supply for the 
RHCs. The result, not unexpectedly, was a sharp decline in AT&T sales of 
network equipment. However, because AT&T had controlled 85 percent of the 
domestic market prior to deregulation, few alternative domestic manufacturers 
were available to replace those sales.29  Thus, it was inevitable that severing the 
industry’s existing  supply  arrangements  would  lead to  a  surge  in  imported 
equipment. 
Second, the MFJ provided an additional, one-time stimulus to the RHCs’ 
demand for digital central office switches that encouraged additional entry. To 
enable telephone subscribers to choose among competing long-distance cani- 
ers, the MFJ mandated that RHCs install switches that would provide “equal 
access” to their local network for all interexchange carriers. Existing analog 
switches in the Bell system could not be modified easily to provide equal ac- 
cess.  This  forced  the  RHCs  to  shift more  quickly  toward  adopting  digital 
switching technologies, whose flexibility allowed equal access. Again, under 
the terms of the MFJ, this new demand was satisfied primarily by unaffiliated 
suppliers, which, in the absence of significant independent domestic capacity, 
led  to foreign  entry. By  the mid-1980s,  however, almost all lines had  been 
converted over to equal access, leading to a slowdown in new switch orders 
and, in turn, in imports. 
Finally, the  combination  of  deregulation  and  asset  specificity in  network 
equipment created a strategic incentive for the RHCs to diversify among sup- 
pliers. The fact that switches must be customized and carefully integrated into 
29. The largest independent U.S. equipment supplier, GTE, had only a 3 percent share of  the 
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a telecommunications system creates the potential for postcontractual opportu- 
nistic behavior or holdups between contracting parties. The regulated Bell sys- 
tem solved this holdup problem through vertical integration between the domi- 
nant supplier of equipment (AT&T and its subsidiary Western Electric) and the 
major purchasers of equipment (the local BOCs). When deregulation split the 
Bell  system, the potential for holdups between AT&T (as the  supplier) and 
the RHCs (as independent purchasers) reemerged and created the strategic in- 
centive for RHCs to diversify their equipment suppliers. The fear of holdups 
contributed to the RHCs’ decision to purchase a greater fraction of their net- 
work equipment from foreign sources after deregulation. 
Seven years after Northern Telecom’s introduction of digital switches, and 
two  years  after  the  MFJ’s  implementation,  import  penetration  in  network 
equipment had risen to 16.3 percent (series 13). Both events played critical- 
and complementary-roles  in opening the U.S. market to foreign trade. Their 
complementarity is evidenced by comparing Northern Telecom’s sales before 
and after deregulation and by comparing sales by Northern Telecom and other 
foreign suppliers in the United States. While Northern Telecom’s introduction 
of digital switches revolutionized network technology and gave the firm a po- 
tential early mover advantage, not until the MFJ severed AT&T’s existing pro- 
curement contracts did Northern Telecom begin  exporting switches in large 
volume to the United States. For example, U.S. imports from Canada (which 
consisted almost entirely of network equipment from Northern Telecom) rose 
in real terms only from $111.7 to $138.8 million between  1978 and 1981 but 
had grown to $342.8  million by  the time the MFJ was fully implemented  in 
1984 (series 25). At the same time, while Northern Telecom’s penetration was 
contingent on deregulation, its early entry into digital technology did confer 
an advantage over foreign competitors. For example, by  1989, Northern Tele- 
com had grown to account for 58 percent of the import market for COSs and 
PBXs, while Japanese firms (NEC, Fujitsu, Toshiba, and Hitachi) held just a 
15 percent share, and European firms (Siemens, Ericsson, and Mitel) held a 
23 percent share.Zo  In countries where telecommunications equipment systems 
were  less  extensive-and  procurement  relationships  were  less  firmly  en- 
trenched-by  comparison,  other foreign  suppliers gained  dominant  market 
shares. For example, NEC supplied 80%  of Thailand’s demand for COSs, 60% 
in Malaysia and 50% in Argentina (Vietor and Yoffie 1993, 172). 
Deregulation created only a temporary window of  contestability, however. 
This window was opened between 1982 and 1985, when US.  demand for net- 
work equipment doubled from $3.06 to $5.95 billion (Electronic  Market Data 
Book  1983, 1986). Responding to this opportunity, real imports more than tri- 
pled from $319.3 to $998.5 million during these three years (series  12). Be- 
cause network switches have an average forty-year life span, however, contract 
opportunities  again closed quickly after this  date. Between  1585 and  1988, 
30. My calculation\, baaed on data in Vietor and Yoffie (1993, 162). 145  Regulation and Telecommunications Trade 
real demand for network equipment declined by 5 percent, real import growth 
slowed markedly, and the trade balance in this industry segment returned to its 
historical position of a small surplus. 
Finally, deregulation also removed restrictions barring AT&T equipment ex- 
ports that had been in place since the 1956 consent decree. AT&T was partially 
successful at exporting large PBXs and COSs, but export sales continued to be 
constrained by procurement regulations in importing markets. With the excep- 
tion of the United Kingdom, which had privatized its telecommunications net- 
work in  1984, European equipment markets were not effectively deregulated 
until  1987, when  technical standards were harmonized  within the European 
Community and equal access requirements were mandated (Vietor and Yoffie 
1993, 148-51).  Thereafter, U.S. network equipment exports grew rapidly and 
were driven primarily by European liberalization (fig. 5.4 above, series 1  l).” 
5.3.4  Regulation and Deregulation in Japan 
The same regulatory policies governing Japan’s terminal equipment market 
also covered sales of  network equipment. Until  1985, NTT retained sole au- 
thority to lease and sell network equipment, which it purchased almost exclu- 
sively from a family of four suppliers headed by NEC. NTT’s preferential sup- 
ply relations  were  very  similar to those  negotiated  between AT&T  and the 
BOCs, although NTT itself was not vertically integrated into manufacturing. 
As with AT&T, these relations excluded both domestic and foreign sources of 
competition. Entry by independent Japanese equipment manufacturers into the 
approved family of suppliers were extremely rare. Likewise, as late as three 
years  prior  to deregulation,  fewer than  1 percent  of Japanese  purchases  of 
switching equipment were imports (Curran 1982, 194; Japan Electronics Al- 
manac 1984, table 7). 
In  contrast to AT&T, equipment exports by the NEC family were not re- 
stricted by Japanese regulatory policy. However, exports remained limited by 
foreign regulatory and economic barriers. Prior to the MFJ’s opening of  the 
U.S. network equipment market in  1982, for example, only  10 percent of  all 
Japanese switch exports were sold in the United States. (By comparison, sig- 
nificantly lower regulatory and economic barriers in the U.S. terminal equip- 
ment market by this date allowed Japan to sell 52 percent of these exports in 
the United States [Japan Electronics Almanac  1984, table 61.) Major destina- 
tions for Japanese switch exports were Asia and Central and South America, 
where telecommunications networks were less extensively developed and sup- 
ply relations therefore were less firmly entrenched. 
Japan’s network equipment market was partially  deregulated in  1985 with 
the passage of the NTT Company Law and the Telecommunications Business 
Law. Unlike deregulation three years earlier in the United States, which led to 
3 1. Japanese exports to Europe also began rising sharply around this period, as indicated in fig. 
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modest growth in import penetration, however, Japanese deregulation had very 
little effect on import  trade  and, in particular, on imports  of  U.S. network 
equipment. Three factors contributed to this asym.metry. First, Japanese dereg- 
ulation  simply withdrew  government enforcement  of  exclusive procurement 
contracts without proactively severing existing supply relations. Deregulation 
converted NTT into a semiprivate corporation subject to competition from ri- 
vals who were not tied to the NEC equipment family. While this reform led to 
a gradual weakening of NEC-NTT procurement ties, it stopped well short of 
AT&T’s divestiture of the BOCs, which both severed existing supply contracts 
and prompted a one-time demand surge to fulfill AT&T’s equal access obliga- 
tions. The NTT Company Law explicitly rejected a government commission’s 
recommendation that NTT be forced to divest its local telephone operations in 
favor of new carriers (Harris 1988, 15).  The result was that economic bamers 
to entry remained largely intact even after regulatory  barriers were removed. 
Five years after Japanese deregulation, therefore, import penetration in switch- 
ing equipment had risen to just 4.1 percent, and the US. share of the Japanese 
market had risen to just 2.9 percent (Japan Electronics Almanac 1993, 1994).” 
The second factor explaining the asymmetric trade response following Japa- 
nese and U.S. deregulation stems from NTT’s decision to maintain its analog 
switching network domestically, long after the introduction of Northern Tele- 
com’s digital switches. NEC, Fujitsu, and Hitachi each had developed digital 
COSs for the export market and had made preliminary sales to several regional 
exchanges in the United States (Hausman and Kohlberg  1989, 199). Despite 
the fact that these three firms also were members of  the NEC family of pre- 
ferred equipment suppliers in Japan, however, NTT chose to attempt to develop 
its own digital system for its local network. During the interim, existing analog 
switches remained in place. As late as 1980, only 26.7 percent of Japan’s COSs 
had  been  converted  over  to  digital,  as  compared  to  44.6  percent  of  U.S. 
switches (McKinsey Global Institute  1992, exhibit 2E-14). the effect of  this 
delayed introduction was to sharply limit Japanese demand for digital switches, 
including imported switches. 
Finally, U.S. exports were hampered  by  Northern Telecom’s earlier entry 
into digital technology. To  the degree that Japanese deregulation opened its 
network  equipment market  to competition,  entry was by  Northern Telecom 
rather than AT&T. In the largest single procurement from a foreign supplier, 
AT&T lost a $250 million contract to supply central office switches to NTT 
for a six-year period beginning  in  1987 (International Trade Administration 
1986, 83). Northern Telecom’s nearly ten years of production experience with 
digital switching provided the firm with a head start in penetrating the Japa- 
nese market. 
37. For the comparable period centered around the AT&T divestiture, by comparison, U.S. im- 
prt  penetration  for network equipment rose from 6.6 to  16.3 percent (Electronic Market Dntn 
Book 1982, 1990). 147  Regulation and Telecommunications Trade 
5.3.5  Summary 
Regulatory policy played a complementary  role with economic barriers to 
entry in shaping network equipment markets in the United  States and Japan. 
In both countries, regulatory  agencies supported business practices  that sus- 
tained near monopoly control over the supply of network equipment. Deregula- 
tion led to trade only when it lowered both regulatory and economic barriers 
to entry. In the United States, the sequential introduction of digital switching 
and the proactive severing of existing supply relations met this condition. Im- 
ports rose, from both  Canada and Japan, although  the continuation  of  sunk 
investments in network equipment encouraged a substantially lower level of 
import penetration than arose in terminal equipment after deregulation. In Ja- 
pan, delayed adoption of digital technologies and deregulation’s failure to sever 
existing supply relations meant that economic barriers remained largely intact. 
This, combined with  Northern  Telecom’s  early mover  advantage in  digital 
switches, sharply  limited  U.S.  exports of  network equipment to Japan. The 
combined effect of  regulatory changes in the United States and Japan, there- 
fore, was to further expand the bilateral trade imbalance. 
5.4  Lessons and Open Issues 
A central conclusion of this paper is that domestic competition policy-and 
regulatory policy in particular-can  have major repercussions for international 
trade. Telecommunications  deregulation  in the United States, and to a lesser 
extent in Japan, was driven primarily by domestic policy objectives and politi- 
cal realities (No11 and Rosenbluth 1993).  Despite policy makers’ inward focus, 
the deconcentration in market structure and opening of procurement networks 
that followed deregulation  had profound implications for the industry’s trade 
balance. These changes pushed  telecommunications  equipment to the top of 
the international trade policy agenda early in the Reagan administration, where 
it remained  a source of friction between the United States and Japan for the 
remainder of the decade. 
A second conclusion drawn from the analysis relates to the common intran- 
sigence of American and Japanese telecommunications service monopolies to 
accept competitive  entry into equipment supply. U.S.  trade negotiators  have 
tended  to overlook this commonality in order to enhance their current  bar- 
gaining position. The USTR accused NTT of  using discriminatory  and need- 
lessly stringent product  standards to deter entry into its network and cellular 
equipment markets. Japan’s historic reliance on stringent “voice quality” stan- 
dards, in contrast to the US.  practice of approving equipment provided that it 
did “no harm to the network,” was a focal point of trade tensions during the 
MOSS negotiations.  The arguments raised by  U.S. trade negotiators  against 
NTT, however, bear a striking resemblance to the complaints raised by AT&T’s 148  Andrew R. Dick 
would-be competitors during the !  950s. AT&T’s success in excluding the in- 
nocuous  Hush-a-Phone attachment  for twenty  years, arguing that  it  would 
harm network quality, attests to the common incentive of incumbent firms to 
use available regulatory barriers to maintain their monopoly position. 
Finally, ongoing regulatory changes in telecommunications can be expected 
again to have important implications  for international trade. Japan’s Ministry 
of Posts and Telecommunications has proposed a divestiture of NTT modeled 
after the vertical  disintegration  of AT&T in  1982-84.  NTT successfully  re- 
sisted this reform when it was first proposed in 1985, but it now stands poised 
for a major reorganization  in market structure and contracting ties to equip- 
ment  suppliers. If  these reforms  are adopted, they would  further erode eco- 
nomic barriers within Japan’s telecommunications  equipment market and could 
be expected to narrow the bilateral trade imbalance in network equipment. In 
the United States, passage of the proposed Telecommunications Act will ex- 
pand deregulation by allowing regional telephone companies to provide long 
distance  service and erode the regional BOCs’ local service monopolies  by 
allowing AT&T and cable television companies to enter these markets. To the 
extent that local  service monopolies have mimicked AT&T’s pre- 1982 exclu- 
sionary  equipment contracting practices,  deregulation  may further  open the 
U.S. network equipment market to entry and international trade. 149  Regulation  and Telecommunications Trade 
Appendix A 
Table 5A.1  Industry Data 
Serieq  1. 
Telecom. 
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lahle 5A.1  (continued) 
Seriei 7.  Series 8.  Series 9,  Series 10.  Series  11,  Series  I?. 
Terminal Equip.  Terminal Equip.  Terminal Equip.  Network Equip.  Network Equip.  Network Equip. 
Exports  Imports  Import  Trade Balance  Exports  Imports 
(Fie.  5.3)  (Fig. 5.3)  Penetration  (Fig. 5.4)  (Fig. 5.41  (Fig.  5.4) 
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Table 5A.1  (continued) 
Series 14, U S  Sene5 17  b S 
Sene,  13  Trade Balance  Senes 15, US  Senes 16, US  Trade Balance 
Network Equip  with Japan in  Exports to  Import\ from  with Europe in 
Import  Telecom  Equip  Japan of  Japan of  Telecom  Equip 
Penetration  (Fig  5 6)  Telecom  Equip  Telecom  Equip  (Fig  5 6) 
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Table 5A.1  (continued) 
Series 20. U.S. 
Trade Balance 
Sene\ IX. U.S.  Sene  19. L.S.  with Other Asia  Series 21. US.  Series 22. US 
Exports to  Imports froin  in Telecom.  Exports to Other  lmpons from 
Europe of  Europe of  Equip  Asia of  Other Asia of 
Telecom. Equip.  Telecom. Equip.  (Fig 5.6)  Telecom. Equip.  Telecom. Equip. 
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Table 5A.1  (continued) 
Series 23. U.S.  Series 26, Japan  Series 27, Japan 
Trade Balance  Series 21. U.S.  Series 25. U.S  Trade Balance  Trade Balance 
with Canada in  Exports to  Imports from  with U.S. in  with Europe in  Series 28, U S. 
Telecom. Equip.  Canada of  Canada of  'Teleconi. Equip.  Telecom. Equip.  Labor Cost 
(Fig.  5.6)  Telecom. Equip.  Telecom. Equip.  (Fig. 5.7)  (Fig. 5.7)  (Fig. 5.8) 









































-  125.6 





-  197.7 
-  132.2 
-217.8 
-  188.2 
-  183.0 
-  122.3 
-47.6 
120.6 
N.A.  N.A. 
N.A.  N.A. 
N.A.  N.A. 
N.A.  N.A. 
N.A.  N.A. 
N.A.  N.A. 
N.A.  N.A. 
N.A.  N.A. 
N.A.  N.A. 
N.A.  N.A. 
N.A.  N.A. 
84.6  111.7 
89.5  156.3 
98. I  223.7 
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Table 5A.1  (continued) 
Series 29.  Senea 30.  Series 3  I,  Series 32. 
Japan Labor Cost  S. Korea Labor Cost  Taiwan Labor Cost  Hong Kong Labor Cost 
(Fig.  5.X)  (Fig. 5.8)  (Fig. 5.8)  (Fig. 5.8) 
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Sonr~~es:  Series ( I ): U.S. fnditsrrinl Ourlook ( 1970-94). Series (2): Stati.srictrlAbsrrac/ ofrhe United Stares 
( I07 I,  198 I, 1994).  Series (3):  Citibase (New  York), main data tape, series GEXMD, GIMMD, and MDS. 
Series (4):  US.  General Accounting Office ( 1992);  Stati.sricalAbsrract  ofrhe UniredSrutes (1994). Series 
(5). f/.X ffduswiul  Ourlook  ( 1982-94).  Series (6)-( 13): Elecrronic Marker Data Book ( 1975-94).  Series 
( l4)-(3): US.  fndusrritrl Our/ouk (1978-94).  Series (26)-(27):  Japan Electronics Alrnanac (1981-94). 
Sene<  (28)-( 32): fnternurionnl Com~Juri.sori.\  of  Hour!\.  Coinpensarion Costs fur Production  Workers in 
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Appendix B 
Table 5B.1  Major US.  and Japanese Regulatory Actions Affecting 
Telecommunications Equipment 
Date  Action  Significance 
I956  AT&T consent decree 
I956  Hush-a-Phone order 









Antitrust case filed against AT&T 
First order registration program 
Second order registration program 
Computer 11 Inquiry 
Understanding on the Interconnect 
Market (Japan) 
Modification of Final Judgment 
announced 
Modification of Final Judgment‘s 
implementation completed 
Telecommunications Business and 
NTT Company Laws (Japan) 
Agreement ending antitrust complaint allowed 
AT&T and Western Electric to remain 
vertically integrated, required AT&T to 
license all patents, and restricted AT&T to 
regulated activities in the domestic market 
FCC permitted attachment of this independent 
device to telephones, but AT&T blocked 
implementation 
FCC permitted customer-owned equipment to 
be connected to network but allowed AT&T 
to charge a discriminatory fee to those 
customers 
Department of Justice seeks to split AT&T 
from Western Electric (eventually settled by 
1982 Modification of Final Judgment) 
independent attachments but excluded 
telephone sets, key sets, and PBXs; AT&T 
delays implementation for two years 
Extends I974 program to apply to telephones, 
key sets, and PBXs; independent equipment 
can be attached after certifying that it poses 
“no harm” to the network 
FCC removed terminal equipment from rate- 
of-return regulation and required AT&T to 
sell equipment through a separate 
subsidiary 
terminal equipment (interconnect) market, 
NTT liberalized certification procedures for 
independent equipment 
Agreement ending 1974 antitrust coinplaint 
required AT&T to divest Bell operating 
companies (BOCs), severed AT&T’a 
exclusive equipment supply contracts with 
BOCs, and organized BOCs into regional 
holding companies (RHCs)  and barred 
them from manufacturing equipment 
Implementation of Modification of Final 
Judgment completed on 1 January 1984 
Deregulation of Japanese terminal and 
network equipment markets that rescinds 
NTT‘s monopoly over first telephone, 
establishes independent standards-setting 
board, and partially privatizes NTT subject 
to competition from rivals not tied to NEC‘c 
equipment family 
FCC clarified standards for certifying 
Following partial deregulation of Japan’s 156  Andrew, R. Dick 
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